Book Project
Foreign Economic Coercion in Contemporary China
Why do some local leaders in China respond to perceived foreign provocations by allowing anti-foreign demonstrations, suspending foreign business operations, and taking other measures that harm foreign commercial interests? Why do other local leaders seek to protect foreign commerce from the potential economic fallout of diplomatic tensions? This book project attempts to explain this variation in Chinese local leader behavior during foreign policy crises.
Given the presence of a strong central government, variation in local leader behavior is puzzling. Understanding this variation is important because whether local leaders are willing to serve as agents of punishment has implications for China’s use of economic coercion. China’s top leaders rely on lower-ranking officials – especially local leaders, who are the stewards of much of China’s foreign commerce – to carry out economic retaliation. However, although the international linkages of local governments give their leaders a stake in foreign policy, the International Relations scholarship has yet to systematically examine when and how local leaders affect state behavior on issues of relevance to international politics and security.
To explain whether and why local leaders participate in economic retaliation, I propose a theory that draws on insights about the career incentives of local leaders. The process by which cadres in the Chinese Communist Party are appointed emphasizes both meritocratic and patronage elements, giving rise to two key explanatory variables. The first is whether local leaders are economically dependent on the implicated foreign state – that is, whether they believe that economic ties to the foreign state are essential to achieving the economic growth necessary for career advancement. The second is whether local leaders are politically vulnerable to disciplinary punishment, either because they lack connections to higher-level leaders or face acute socio-economic problems.
I show that economic dependence and political vulnerability have cross-cutting effects on local leader behavior in the context of recent political crises in China’s relations with Japan, South Korea, and the United States. The periods of tension that I focus on include: the 2012 Sino-Japan crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; the 2017 Sino-South Korean crisis over Seoul’s deployment of the THAAD anti-missile defense system; and Sino-U.S. tensions over trade in 2018-19.
Drawing on interview data gathered during 14 months of fieldwork in China, I conduct in-depth case studies of local leader responses in eight Chinese cities. Also, because local official media provide a window into local leaders’ preferred posture choices toward foreign commercial interests, I test the theory through computerized text analyses of Chinese-language local official newspapers in more than seventy cities.
Given the presence of a strong central government, variation in local leader behavior is puzzling. Understanding this variation is important because whether local leaders are willing to serve as agents of punishment has implications for China’s use of economic coercion. China’s top leaders rely on lower-ranking officials – especially local leaders, who are the stewards of much of China’s foreign commerce – to carry out economic retaliation. However, although the international linkages of local governments give their leaders a stake in foreign policy, the International Relations scholarship has yet to systematically examine when and how local leaders affect state behavior on issues of relevance to international politics and security.
To explain whether and why local leaders participate in economic retaliation, I propose a theory that draws on insights about the career incentives of local leaders. The process by which cadres in the Chinese Communist Party are appointed emphasizes both meritocratic and patronage elements, giving rise to two key explanatory variables. The first is whether local leaders are economically dependent on the implicated foreign state – that is, whether they believe that economic ties to the foreign state are essential to achieving the economic growth necessary for career advancement. The second is whether local leaders are politically vulnerable to disciplinary punishment, either because they lack connections to higher-level leaders or face acute socio-economic problems.
I show that economic dependence and political vulnerability have cross-cutting effects on local leader behavior in the context of recent political crises in China’s relations with Japan, South Korea, and the United States. The periods of tension that I focus on include: the 2012 Sino-Japan crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; the 2017 Sino-South Korean crisis over Seoul’s deployment of the THAAD anti-missile defense system; and Sino-U.S. tensions over trade in 2018-19.
Drawing on interview data gathered during 14 months of fieldwork in China, I conduct in-depth case studies of local leader responses in eight Chinese cities. Also, because local official media provide a window into local leaders’ preferred posture choices toward foreign commercial interests, I test the theory through computerized text analyses of Chinese-language local official newspapers in more than seventy cities.
Journal Articles and Book Chapters
“Stormy Seas: The South China Sea in US-China Relations” (with M. Taylor Fravel), in Security and US-China Relations: Differences, Dangers, and Dilemmas, eds. Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle, Brookings Institution Press (2021).
“COVID-19 and Fieldwork: Challenges and Solutions,” PS: Political Science & Politics, January 2021 (with Peter Krause, Ora Szekely, Mia Bloom, Fotini Christia, Sarah Zukerman Daly, Chappell Lawson, Zoe Marks, Aidan Milliff, Richard Nielsen, Emil Asian Souleimanov, William Reno, Aliyu Zakayo)
“Campaign Rhetoric and Chinese Reactions to New Leaders” (with Jessica Chen Weiss), Asian Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2020)
“COVID-19 and Fieldwork: Challenges and Solutions,” PS: Political Science & Politics, January 2021 (with Peter Krause, Ora Szekely, Mia Bloom, Fotini Christia, Sarah Zukerman Daly, Chappell Lawson, Zoe Marks, Aidan Milliff, Richard Nielsen, Emil Asian Souleimanov, William Reno, Aliyu Zakayo)
“Campaign Rhetoric and Chinese Reactions to New Leaders” (with Jessica Chen Weiss), Asian Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2020)
Working Papers
“Agents of Punishment? Local Leaders and Economic Coercion in China” (revise and resubmit)
"Strongman Politics and China's Foreign Policy: Explaining Maritime Assertiveness Under Xi Jinping" (revise and resubmit)
"A Perfect Storm: Power Transition and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea" (with M. Taylor Fravel)
“Second Image Squared: The Interactive Effects of Bureaucratic Politics in US-China Relations, 2009-2016” (with Rachel Esplin Odell)
"Strongman Politics and China's Foreign Policy: Explaining Maritime Assertiveness Under Xi Jinping" (revise and resubmit)
"A Perfect Storm: Power Transition and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea" (with M. Taylor Fravel)
“Second Image Squared: The Interactive Effects of Bureaucratic Politics in US-China Relations, 2009-2016” (with Rachel Esplin Odell)
Other Publications
“The Domestic Sources of China’s Maritime Assertiveness Under Xi Jinping,” in Lucas Myers, ed. Essays on China and US Policy, Wilson Center, June 2022.
“Ukraine a Cautionary Tale for a China Eyeing Taiwan,” 360info, May 24, 2022.
“Engagement Revisited: Progress Made and Lessons Learned from the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” National Committee on American Foreign Policy, September 2021 (with Tiffany Barron, Rorry Daniels, M. Patrick Hulme, Daniel Jasper, and Craig Kafura).
"China's leaders say that Biden offers a 'new window of hope.' Their experts are more skeptical," Washington Post Monkey Cage blog, January 21, 2021 (with Jessica Chen Weiss)
“The Domestic Roots of Chinese Assertiveness,” Précis, MIT Center for International Studies, Spring 2019.
“The Implications of Increased Internal Control on China’s International Behavior,” in AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives, A Strategic Multilayer Assessment Periodic Publication, ed. Nicholas D. Wright (January 2018).
“How Will China Treat the New President?” The Washington Quarterly, December 2016 (with Jessica Chen Weiss).
“Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?,” Washington Post Monkey Cage blog, December 6, 2016 (with Jessica Chen Weiss)
Photo above: Dalian, Liaoning
“Ukraine a Cautionary Tale for a China Eyeing Taiwan,” 360info, May 24, 2022.
“Engagement Revisited: Progress Made and Lessons Learned from the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” National Committee on American Foreign Policy, September 2021 (with Tiffany Barron, Rorry Daniels, M. Patrick Hulme, Daniel Jasper, and Craig Kafura).
"China's leaders say that Biden offers a 'new window of hope.' Their experts are more skeptical," Washington Post Monkey Cage blog, January 21, 2021 (with Jessica Chen Weiss)
“The Domestic Roots of Chinese Assertiveness,” Précis, MIT Center for International Studies, Spring 2019.
“The Implications of Increased Internal Control on China’s International Behavior,” in AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives, A Strategic Multilayer Assessment Periodic Publication, ed. Nicholas D. Wright (January 2018).
“How Will China Treat the New President?” The Washington Quarterly, December 2016 (with Jessica Chen Weiss).
“Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?,” Washington Post Monkey Cage blog, December 6, 2016 (with Jessica Chen Weiss)
Photo above: Dalian, Liaoning
